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1) INTRODUCTION
In this paper we intend to discuss the relationship between long term development trajectories,
which in  principle  can be expected to  affect  the  functioning of  all  economic systems,  and the
deviations which can be expected to occur at a local level in particular countries or regions. We will
first discuss this relationship at a very general level in terms of the forces and factors which can
affect the convergence and divergence of separate but interacting economic systems at the national
or regional level. Subsequently we will analyse the implications of the different existing theories of
international trade for the convergence of divergence of the economic systems of different countries
. Finally we will take into account the trajectories which can be empirically identified in long run
economic development and the deviations which can be detected in particular countries. 
2) CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE.
The  world  economic  system  is  constituted  by  separate  but  interacting  subsystems.  Different
countries  and regions  are  separated  by boundaries  including differences  in  languages,  cultures,
institutions and natural endowments amongst others. Interactions between different countries have
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existed since the beginning of human history in the form of trade and war. However, the amount of
interaction has increased recently due to the progress of travel and communications. Within the
development paths of countries we can identify both phenomena occurring locally and forces which
tend to diffuse habits and routines created locally over very large portions of the world economic
system. Innovation would be an example of the former phenomena, trade and technology transfer
examples of the latter diffusive forces. Local phenomena can be expected to raise the heterogeneity
of the world economic system and diffusive forces to reduce it, or to raise the homogeneity. The
dynamic  combination of  local  phenomena  and of  diffusive  forces  will  determine  the  extent  of
convergence and of divergence in the world economic system at any given time. The growing speed
of  transport,  the  enormous  improvements  in  ITC  which  occurred  recently  have  enormously
facilitated  trade  and  the  flow  of  ideas  and  knowledge  between  countries,  both  examples  of
extremely  powerful  diffusive  forces  tending  to  homogenise  the  world  economic  system.  The
expression 'the death of distance' has been used to signify that there is no more need for people to be
at the same place in order to collaborate since modern ITC would allow to coordinate their actions
over very long distances. It  must be noticed that the terms convergence and divergence can be
referred either to outcomes of the process of economic development (for example GDP per head) or
to institutional structures and productive processes used to achieve it. The latter can be considered
ingredients required to obtain the former. Then we can expect less developed countries to observe
and possibly to imitate the institutional structures and/or the productive processes which seem to be
linked to particularly high rates of growth. Their objective is to develop (for example to reach a
higher GDP per head), that is, to catch up in outcomes by imitating the ingredients used elsewhere
to develop. If to create the adequate institutional structures and the productive processes which
seem to be linked to development were the only possible mechanism of economic development we
should  expect  the  extent  of  convergence  towards  outcomes  to  be  reflected  in  an  equivalent
convergence of  institutional structures and of productive processes. However, if more than one
development path which can create comparable outcomes exists then convergence in outcomes may
not imply an equivalent convergence in institutional structures and in productive processes. To put it
differently countries can use different ingredients, or mixtures of, to develop. 
Before proceeding to analyse in greater detail the socio-economic phenomena and diffusive forces
which could determine convergence or divergence it is worth noticing that the previous discussion
can be applied in general terms to any type of complex systems. In fact, the concepts of reactions
and  forces have  been derived  from the  study  of  physical  and  chemical  systems   (see  Nicolis,
Prigogine, 1989, Haken, 1983) but they can equally be applied to social and biological systems. Of
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course, the variables involved are specific to each type of system and the dynamics potentially
similar although not necessarily identical. Socio-economic systems have a structure, constituted by
their subsystems separated by boundaries but generally interacting. (see Frenken et al, 1998) This
structure changes in the course of time as new subsystems are created and as some old ones become
extinct. This provides us with a generalized definition of structural change, a phenomenon which
has been studied in a narrower way in economics. Perhaps the best known example of structural
change is the massive reallocation of labour from agriculture to manufacturing and services
that accompanies  the growth process.  However,  structural change can be detected also
within the manufacturing or the services sectors ( e .g. Salter 1962; Fagerberg, 2000 ) .  
In Socio - economic systems innovations occur locally, typically in already highly developed
countries,  and then diffuse  to the  rest of the  world.  Complete  convergence  would be
conceivable  only  if  the  rate  at  which  new  innovations  were  created  ( R In)  was
systematically smaller than the rate at which diffusive forces continued to operate ( R Diff) ,
that is if RDiff˃ RIn.  If the two rates  change in the  course  of time then the extent of
convergence or of divergence of the system depends on their ratio. 
We are now going to examine what existing theories of growth, of international trade or
of innovation  can  tell us  about  the  possible  convergence  or  divergence  of economic
systems.  The first growth models which provided us with very clear,  if not necessarily
right,  implications  about  this  problem were  those  based  on  Solow's  ( 1956 )  model.
According to this model economic growth resulted from increasing capital intensity or from
technical progress.  In fact,  Solow found ( 1957 )  that technical progress  accounted for
the  largest  share  of growth in the  USA between 1909  and 1949.  In this  vintage  of
growth models the addition of capital to the economic system raised productivity but at a
decreasing rate.  Thus,  if growth had been based only on physical capital one  should
have expected all countries eventually to reach the maximum possible intensity of capital
and  different national economic systems  to converge.  Of course,  the  extent to which
technical progress was an important factor contributing to economic growth depended on
TrajConvDivGlobelics09/                                4
the  ways  in which it could be  organized  in different  countries.  Unfortunately Solow's
model did not allow any answer to be given to this particular question since technical
progress was determined as a residual, that is, what was left over after the contribution
of capital was accounted for. Denison ( 1962 )  subsequently decomposed the residual into
many  different  components,  including  scale  economies,  the  educational  levels  of  the
labour force,  shorter working days,  the increased participation of females  in the labour
force etc. However,  although Solow was the first economist to explicitly account for the
importance  of  technical  progress  in  economic  growth,  since  the  residual  was  not
decomposed by most users of his model,  no clear implications could be derived about
the possible convergence or divergence of national economic systems.  A serious limit of
Solow's model was the exogenous character of technical progress. Subsequent vintages of
growth models,  such as  the so called endogenous growth ones ( Romer,  1990;  Aghion
and  Howitt,  1992;  Helpman  Grossman  1991 )  or  evolutionary  growth  models  ( Dosi,
Fagiolo, Roventini, 2006,  2008,  Saviotti, Pyka, 2004,  2008,  Montobbio, 2002 )  placed
innovation at the centre of the growth process. Innovation had now become an economic
phenomenon  funded  by  economic  resources  and  contributing  to  economic  outcomes.
Within this more recent vintage of growth models increasing returns were possible and
allowed economists to explain why rates of growth would not systematically decline in the
course  of  time.  As  for  convergence,  the  presence  of  increasing  returns  and  the
uncertainty surrounding  the  possible  outcomes  of innovation  made  any  prediction  very
difficult but it certainly excluded that convergence  would be the only or the necessary
final stage of economic development. 
The theories of international trade which emerged in the course of time began with the
Ricardian  theory  based  on  comparative  advantage,  which  was  then  followed  by  the
Hescher - Ohlin theory in which comparative advantage depended on national endowments,
mostly of natural resources,  until the so called new technology theories of international
trade  ( Posner,  1961,  Vernon,  1966;  Fagerberg,  1988,  Soete  1987,  1982,  Krugman,
TrajConvDivGlobelics09/                                5
1979,  1980 )  started to stress  the role played by technology and innovation. According
to  these  theories  more  innovative  countries,  typically  in  the  North,  would  create
innovations  which  would  subsequently diffuse  to  less  developed  countries  where  they
would be first purchased and used and later produced, once the technologies on which
they were based had moved from innovative to mature.  In their earliest versions these
theories allowed for an avenue by means of which initially less developed countries could
move up the development ladder, if not necessarily to catch up. Low income countries in
the South could be  expected to imitate  the  technologies  created in the  North and to
gradually  climb  on  the  development  ladder.  Of  course,  this  mechanism  would  not
necessarily lead low income countries to catch up with high income ones. It could simply
keep the income gap between the two constant or to let it grow at a slower pace than
if low income countries  did not imitate  at  all.  As for the  high income countries  they
need to keep innovating if they wish to keep the advantage they have with respect to
low income countries. 
Recent  research  results  show  that  a  development  strategy  based  only  on  imitation
becomes increasingly less effective ( Fagerberg,  Verspagen 2007 )  or can at best serve
to lift countries  from low to middle income levels  but no further (Lee  et  al 2008 ) .
According  to  Fagerberg  and  Verspagen  to  catch  up  by  means  only of  imitation  is
becoming increasingly difficult. Countries which have managed to develop after the 1980s
have  done  so  by creating their national innovation system.  Thus,  it seems  as  if the
strategies required to catch up keep evolving in the course of time. If in the 1960s and
1970s  it was  possible for some countries  of the  South to develop by imitating some
technologies  created  in the  countries  of the  North,  this  development  path  seems  to
become  increasingly difficult to follow.  This  result is  not  altogether  very surprising.  It
simply reflects  the  growing knowledge  intensity of the  most advanced countries  in the
world.  In the period 1962 - 1999 the R&D intensity and the level of human capital of
many  countries  increased  substantially.  During  this  period  we  can  expect  the  R&D
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intensity of most innovations to have grown.  This implies  that those  innovations  which
were created with R&D need R&D to be imitated. In fact, R&D is used both to create
new knowledge and to create an absorptive capacity ( Cohen, Levinthal, 1989 )  for what
competing firms or organisations have done.  Thus,  R&D carried out in a  given field of
knowledge creates absorptive capacity for the same field. This implies that imitation is no
longer possible by simply using labour of low wages and low skills but that it requires
the same ingredients used by the initial innovators.  Thus,  as  Fagerberg and Verspagen
found,  simple imitation is no longer possible.  In the most recent period ( 1980 - 2000 )
only those  countries  which managed  to  create  their  innovation  systems,  within which
higher education and R&D were central factors,  succeeded in catching up.  Conversely,
there  could  still be  a  number  of innovations  which  can  be  simply imitated  without
constructing an innovation system, but the imitation of such innovations could only lift a
country from low to middle income per head (Lee  et al,  2008 ) .  For example,  LDCs
can  still  enter  the  production  of textiles,  but  only in  particularly low skill and  low
technology subsets.  Even within textiles subsets of much higher knowledge intensity have
emerged,  the  imitation  of  which  would  require  a  more  complex  and  sophisticated
innovation system than most countries  at very low levels of economic development can
afford. This means that imitation in some form is still possible but that it requires much
more complex and sophisticated ingredients than in previous periods.  In this context we
can call simple the imitation processes which can occur based on low labour costs,  on
low levels of human capital and by targeting the production of goods the demand for
which is price sensitive. We can expect the scope of this simple imitation to shrink as
most emerging innovations are increasingly R&D intensive. 
The previous considerations mean that the targets of imitation required to catch up and
the barriers involved change in the course of time.  This has interesting implications for
development.  The  concept  of the  advantages  of backwardness  ( Gerschenkron,  1962 )
needs  to be  revisited  in this  context.  This  may be  interpreted  as  meaning that  the
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further  away a  country is  from the  technological  frontier  the  greater  its  development
scope. Such scope could be represented by the repertoire of productive processes which
the country has not yet used and can in principle learn. However, the distance from the
frontier as  a  measure of the advantages  of backwardness,  is at best a  necessary but
not  a  sufficient  condition  for development.  If the  leading  countries  keep  moving  the
technological frontier forward by changing the ways in which knowledge can be created
and used,  the  potential advantages  of backwardness  can  increase  for LDCs but their
ability to make use  of these  advantages  may not necessarily follow.  Only those  LDCs
which manage to create the required institutions, such as higher education and R&D, will
be able to imitate and to reduce their distance with respect to the technological frontier.
This means that total convergence would only take place if all LDCs could create the
institutions required to catch up with a moving technological frontier. 
3 )  TRAJECTORIES AND NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS
The previous section showed that various theories of growth or of international trade do
not lead  us  to foresee  the  convergence  of different  countries  of the  world economic
system either for what concerns outcomes ( for example levels of GDP per head )  or for
what concerns the institutional structures and the productive processes  required to attain
such  outcomes.  If anything  the  theories  considered  predicted  a  dynamically  evolving
combination of phenomena  created locally,  such as  innovation,  and of diffusive forces,
such as  diffusion and technology transfer,  which would tend to diffuse  innovations and
the relevant knowledge to all countries.  In this section we discuss  the implications  for
convergence  and  divergence  of the  concepts  of trajectories  and  of National Innovation
Systems ( NIS ) .  A trajectory can be defined as a path defining a long term trend  in
the space of some variables.  For example, if one were to plot the values of GDP per
head of the countries of the world during a  period of time one would find a  cloud of
points oriented in a direction implying a growing GDP per head. We could say that the
curve best fitting the points of the diagram represents the trajectory of GDP per head in
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the  course  of time.  However,  although the  curve  is  likely to have  a  positive  slope,
meaning that most countries will have had a positive rate of growth of GDP per head, it
is possible for some or even for most countries  to have had a  lower or higher than
average  growth rate  of GDP per head.  Thus,  the  existence  of a  trajectory does  not
imply that the trajectory is followed in the same way by all countries or in general all
the  members  of the  population  affected  by  the  trajectory.  The  concept  of trajectory
involves a trend and a dispersion around the trend, the extent of such dispersion varying
in individual cases.  A more sophisticated,  although more difficult to define operationally,
concept of trajectory has  been used in the  literature  on innovation where Nelson and
Winter  ( 1977 )  used  the  concept  of  natural  trajectories  and  Dosi  ( 1982 )  that  of
technological  trajectories.  In both  of these  cases  trajectories  define  directions  for the
evolution of given technologies  or designs  which are  followed by most socio economic
agents.  The emergence  of a  trajectory acts  as  constraint on the population of socio -
economic agents who can in principle be affected by it by ruling out alternative modes
of behaviour.  However,  as  previously pointed  out,  a  trajectory does  not  rule  out  a
residual variance in the behaviour of the members of the population affected by it. 
Previous  work showed  the  existence  of a  trajectory leading to  the  growth of output
variety in the regions of the Netherlands ( Frenken et al,  2007 ) ,  of the export variety
of OECD countries ( Saviotti and Frenken,  2008 )  and of the export variety of all the
countries of the world ( Saviotti, Nesta, Javaid, 2008 ) .  The results of this work showed
that the growth of export variety is a  determinant of the growth of GDP,  of GDP per
head and of labour productivity.  An interesting distinction has  been introduced into this
work by Frenken et al ( 2 007 )  between related and unrelated variety. The former is the
variety which one  can  measure  at  a  relatively low level of aggregation amongst  the
entities which are members of the same group and which can also be called intra - group
variety.  On the  other hand,  unrelated  variety can  be  measured at  a  higher level of
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aggregation at  which the  entities  considered  have  a  higher  level of dissimilarity.  For
example,  we  could  measure  related  variety  within  a  group  of products  in consumer
electronics while unrelated variety would be measured at a level of aggregation at which
consumer electronics,  chemicals,  shoes,  equipment etc existed.  An interesting  result of
the previous work is that only related export variety is a  determinant of growth in the
short run while unrelated export variety becomes a  determinant of growth in the longer
run.  These  results  can be  interpreted by saying that countries  need to diversify their
exports if they want to grow but that in the short run they can only do it profitably if
they diversify in the neighbourhood of their previous production and knowledge structures.
Obviously to try and  diversify by introducing into their production structure  goods  and
services completely different from the pre - existing ones  would not pay off in the short
run. However, the fact that unrelated export variety becomes a determinant of growth in
the longer run means that unless the goods and services which will contribute to future
export performance of the country are prepared in advance of their commercial success,
the  continuous  incremental  improvement  of  past  export  types  is  likely  to  run  into
diminishing returns.  These  results  imply that  the  existence  of this  trajectory does  not
necessarily imply that successful countries will converge on the same types of exports, or
even less so on the same institutional configurations. First, the fact that in the short run
only related export variety is a determinant of growth means that the productive structure
of a country cannot be changed overnight and that the near future preserves a memory
of the  immediate  past,  thus  involving a  degree  of path dependency.  In other words,
development can occur but by 'small' steps,  a  result compatible with that of Hidalgo et
al  ( 2 007 )  with  completely  different  techniques.  Since  countries  start  from  different
situations,  they could at best converge without necessarily becoming identical.  Even this
outcome is not guaranteed. If the output variety of the world economic system increases
during economic development each country can choose its future exports in a  range of
growing  width.  Whether  each  country  becomes  more  similar  to  the  others  or  more
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specialized depends on the ratio of world output variety and of national export variety. If
the  former  rate  is  greater  than  the  latter  countries  raise  their export  variety without
becoming  more  similar  to  one  another.  In the  next  section  we  will describe  some
empirical results  aimed  at  testing the  convergence  or divergence  of different countries
based  on their export variety.  However,  before  passing to the  discussion of empirical
results we need to take into account the literature on national innovation systems. 
The  concept  of national system of innovation ( NSI )  emerged in  the  1980s to  take into
account the  important roles played by both innovation and knowledge in economic development
while simultaneously stressing that innovations were developed and used within institutions and
that  such institutions  were interacting (Freeman,  1987;  Lundvall,  1992;  Nelson,  1992;  Edquist,
1997). The concept of NSI is thus truly systemic, (Lundvall, 2007) in that one cannot expect any
type of emerging institution required for economic progress to fit within all pre-existing NSIs. As a
consequence we cannot expect any NSI to be equally able to develop a successful R&D or higher
education system. Furthermore, the concept of NSI was based on two persistent asymmetries in (i)
output  structures  and in  (ii)  institutional  configurations.  On the whole,  for  the  purposes of  the
present  paper  the  concept  of  NSI  tends  to  imply  that  the  above  asymmetries  can  persist  for
considerably long periods of time giving rise to national interpretations of general trajectories. 
4) EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In our previous work we have shown that export variety, either in its related or in its unrelated form
is a determinant of GDP, of GDP per capita and of labour productivity of OECD countries (Saviotti,
Frenken, 2008) and of all the countries of the world (Saviotti, Nesta, Javaid, 2008). Related (REV)
and unrelated (UEV) export variety are measured at different levels of aggregation, higher for UEV
and lower for REV. The meaning of the previous results is that countries need to diversify their
exports in order to grow but in the short run they have better chances of growing by diversifying in
the  neighbourhood  in  product  space  of  their  previous  exports.  This  result  coincides  with  that
obtained by different means by Hidalgo et al (2007). In the previous papers we also showed that
while related export variety (REV) is a determinant of growth in the short run unrelated export
variety (UEV) becomes a determinant if we lengthen our period of observation. Thus, while the
pay-off obtained by diversifying one's exports in the neighbourhood of the previous ones is greater
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than by beginning to export completely new products, continued growth in the longer run can only
be  sustained  by  gradually  creating  new types  of  exports.  If  this  were  the  only  mechanism of
economic development we would expect  to observe a trajectory according to which the export
variety of countries rises in the course of economic development. However, our previous work
showed  that,  although  this  trajectory  emerges  as  an  important  mechanism  of  economic
development, it may not necessarily be the only possible one. If the trajectory exists, at any given
time there is a dispersion of behaviours around the trajectory. This is not to deny that the export
variety of some countries may fall in the course of time. If such countries were only those which do
not develop, the existence of the trajectory would be confirmed and reinforced. However, what
seems to be happening is that some countries which grow do it without having a growing export
variety and others have a more complex development path with export variety growing in some
periods and falling in others. For example, some countries which are very rich in natural resources,
and in particular in oil, such as Norway, Venezuela and Algeria, manage to grow while having very
low and/or  falling  export  variety.  Furthermore,  the  ratio  of  REV to  UEV is  very  different  for
different countries. Finally, as world output variety grows we can expect individual countries to
have a growing possibility to raise their export variety without necessarily becoming more similar
or identical to other countries. Thus, even if growing export variety were a dominant mechanism of
economic development for most countries, this would not necessarily lead to the convergence of
these countries. 
To  study  the  trade  off  between  convergence  and  divergence  in  presence  of  a  trajectory  we
represented  the  distribution  of  outcomes  (GDP per  capita)  and  of  possible  mechanisms  used
(related, unrelated export variety and exports) during the period 1962-1999. We used the UN data
on world exports cleaned by Feenstra et al (2002). In all these cases (see Figs 1-4) the distributions
are multimodal, trimodal for GDP per capita and bimodal for REV, UEV and exports. Since in each
of the figs 1-4 the variables are represented separately for the sub periods 1962-1970, 1970-1980,
1980-1990 and 1990-1999 we can see that the distributions become generally flatter and wider and
that the average distance between the peaks tends to increase. While their flatter nature would seem
to indicate that distributions are becoming more even, the growing width and distance between the
peaks implies that the distance between the richest and the poorest country or between the most and
the least export intensive country tended to grow during the period 1962-1999. Thus, it seems that
during  the  period  of  study  there  has  been  divergence  of  outcomes  (GDP per  capita)  and  of
mechanisms used (TEV, REV, UEV, Exports). 






































Fig  2.  Distribution  of  related  export  variety  (REV)  during  the  periods  1962-1970,  1970-1980,












































Fig 4. Distribution of exports during the periods 1962-1970, 1970-1980, 1980-1990 and 1990-1999
TrajConvDivGlobelics09/                                14
To achieve  a  better  understanding  of  the  situation  we  studied  the  influence  of  Related  Export
Variety (REV), of Unrelated Export Variety (UEV) and of proximity on the GDP per capita of
countries  in  different  periods and for  different  starting  income ranges  (Table  1).  The first  two
variables have already been defined. Proximity is measured as the inverse of the similarity of the
exports of countries. In turn, similarity is measured by means of a cosine function already used by
ecologists (Pielou, 1984) and by Jaffe (1986) to measure the similarity of biological species and of
innovations respectively. GDP is always a determinant of growth but with a negative sign. This
means that the higher the starting GDP the lower the expected rate of growth. Equivalently, the
further away a country starts from the (GDP) frontier, the higher we can expect its growth rate to
be. The regressions for the whole sample indicate that in the short run both related export variety
 Table  1.  Influence  of  Related  Export  Variety  (REV),  Unrelated  Export  Variety  (UEV) and of
proximity on the GDP per capita of countries in different periods and for different starting income
levels. 
 and proximity are determinants of GDP per capita. While the former result confirms our previous
findings, the importance of proximity means that although in the course of time countries tend to
raise  their  export  variety  they do it  in  an increasingly similar  way.  This  result  would seem to
contradict the conclusions we drew from the distribution curves of GDP per capita, of REV, of UEV
and of exports, according to which the difference between the top and the bottom performer in each
of  the  variables  had been increasing during the period studied.  To clarify  the situation we ran
separate regressions for two sub-periods (1962-1980 and 1981-1999) and for three income levels
(low,middle  and high).  In  the first  period (1962-1980)  GDP, openness,  labour productivity and
proximity are significant. The significance of proximity means that some degree of convergence
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
VARIABLES WHOLE SAMPLE WHOLE SAMPLE WHOLE SAMPLE 62-80 81-99 low GDP per capita middle GDP per capita high GDP per capita
lngdp -0.0502 -0.0493 -0.0500 0.0225 -0.128 -0.0841 -0.0687 -0.00659
[0.0153]*** [0.0151]*** [0.0153]*** [0.0432] [0.0274]*** [0.0356]** [0.0296]** [0.0234]
lnopenc 0.0310 0.0330 0.0310 0.0431 0.0232 0.0235 0.0400 0.0310
[0.00432]*** [0.00415]*** [0.00432]*** [0.00762]*** [0.00683]*** [0.00812]*** [0.00823]*** [0.00782]***
lnrgdpwok -0.00710 -0.00339 -0.00766 -0.147 -8.24e-05 0.0151 -0.0145 -0.0621
[0.0151] [0.0151] [0.0151] [0.0445]*** [0.0247] [0.0339] [0.0289] [0.0222]***
lnpop -0.00613 -0.00278 -0.00482 -0.0249 -0.00926 -0.0780 0.0188 -0.0482
[0.0158] [0.0156] [0.0158] [0.0414] [0.0375] [0.0586] [0.0354] [0.0266]*
lunrelvar -0.0300 -0.0337 0.00269 -0.0629 -0.0332 0.0279 -0.0323
[0.0102]*** [0.0104]*** [0.0203] [0.0180]*** [0.0206] [0.0203] [0.0160]**
lrelvar 0.0276 0.0301 0.00289 0.0543 0.0282 -0.0179 0.0313
[0.00837]*** [0.00846]*** [0.0173] [0.0142]*** [0.0174] [0.0161] [0.0121]***
proximity_1dc 0.0141 0.0173 0.0292 0.0179 0.0308 0.0152 0.0205
[0.00834]* [0.00850]** [0.0144]** [0.0147] [0.0174]* [0.0170] [0.0122]*
Constant 0.940 0.819 0.919 01/01/53 01/02/71 01/01/97 01/01/71 01/01/18
[0.123]*** [0.115]*** [0.123]*** [0.293]*** [0.293]*** [0.467]*** [0.295]*** [0.184]***
Observations 3945 3945 3945 1945 2000 1347 1292 1306
R-squared 0.088 0.085 0.089 0.115 0.094 0.085 0.122 0.208
Number of cid 131 131 131 106 131 55 73 58
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in brackets
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was  occurring,  but  that  such  catch-up  was  not  obtained  by  means  of  growing  export  variety.
Interestingly, labour productivity is significant but with a negative sign. This means that the further
away a country is from the frontier of labour productivity, the higher we can expect its growth rate
to be. While the significance of labour productivity might seem simply to reinforce that of GDP we
distinguish between the frontiers of different variables, and in particular between those of outcomes
(e.g. GDP per capita) and those of inputs or intermediate inputs. For example, labour productivity or
export  variety  can  be  considered  ingredients  required  to  achieve  the  growth  of  GDP.  If  the
relationship between GDP per  capita  and labour  productivity  or  export  variety  were to  remain
constant in the course of time we could expect their distance with respect to their relative frontiers
to be the same and to remain constant in the course of time. However, if in the course of time or for
different  income  ranges  the  mechanisms  of  economic  development  change  we  can  expect  the
relative roles of various potential determinants of growth to change. For the period (1981-1999)
openness, UEV, and REV are significant determinants of growth. Labour productivity is no longer a
determinant of growth while REV and UEV are, although UEV has a negative sign. Thus, (i) the
distance from the frontier of GDP still matters but that from the frontier of labour productivity does
not; (ii) related export variety (REV) is a determinant of growth in the short run (we have no delays
in these regressions) but unrelated export variety (UEV) is a negative determinant in the short run.
Clearly,  the mechanisms of growth and catch up have changed from 1962-1980 to 1981-1999.
While in 1962-1980 countries could develop without worrying about the variety of their exports in
1981-1999 they needed to raise their export variety to develop. Two observations are in order here:
first,  during the period 1981-1999,  and particularly at  its  beginning,  the  strategy of  export  led
industrialisation  started  to  be  considered  by  some  scholars  of  development  as  the  'good'
development strategy, as opposed to import substitution industrialisation; second, in order to raise
its export variety a country is likely to need to start innovating and producing new types of output.
In this sense our result is quite compatible with that of Fagerberg and Verspagen (2007) according
to whom imitation was a possible catch-up mechanism only in the first period while in the most
recent period countries needed to create their innovation system to catch up. As already pointed out,
we distinguish between simple imitation, which is possible without carrying out R&D, and a more
complex form of imitation,  which requires the construction of an absorptive capacity for  those
innovations which have been created by R&D in the first place. Of course, such a level of R&D
cannot be developed without creating an innovation system. A further contribution to the change in
development  and  catch-up   mechanisms  between  the  two  periods  could  come  from the  lesser
importance attached to exports in the first period. During this period countries could have focused
more on substituting imports than on creating exports and they could have switched to a more
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export intensive strategy in the second period. 
Development mechanisms seem to differ also amongst different starting income levels. Amongst the
variables  used  in  the  regressions  for  countries  of  low  income  per  capita  GDP,  openness  and
proximity are significant, for middle income per capita only GDP and openness are significant, and
for high income per capita openness, labour productivity, population, REV, UEV and proximity are
significant.  For  high  income per  capita  countries  labour  productivity,  population and  UEV are
significant  but  negative  determinants  of  growth.  These  results  mean  that  (i)  development,  and
consequently catch-up, mechanisms and strategies differ depending on the starting level of income
per capita of countries. Only countries having reached high levels of income per capita need to
increase their related export variety to grow. The negative signs of labour productivity, population
and UEV mean that (i) the lower the starting labour productivity the higher the expected rate of
growth for this income per capita level; (ii) the lower the population the higher the expected rate of
growth; (iii) as we had already found out in our previous study (Saviotti, Nesta Javaid, 2008) in the
short run to raise REV is an economically sustainable strategy while to raise UEV is not. In this
respect our results coincide with those of Lee et al (2008). 
5) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this  paper  we  have  analysed  the  changing balance  between  convergence  and  divergence  in
economic  development  in  presence  of  trajectories  which  in  principle  can  provide  a  common
constraint for all countries. We did not find in the literature on growth, on international trade and on
innovation any strong reasons or overwhelming evidence to believe that the convergence of national
economic  systems  is  likely.  Rather,  all  these  theories  stress  both  factors  which  could  lead  to
convergence and factors which could lead to divergence. In general we can expect that possible
paths  of  economic  development  will  be  determined by  the  dynamic  equilibria  between factors
leading to convergence and factors leading to divergence. Our results show that: (i)  there is no
overall convergence since the distributions of GDP per capita, of REV, of UEV and of exports are
consistently multimodal and become wider, although slightly flatter, between 1962 and 1999. Some
evidence for the significance of proximity exists  in econometric regressions in which GDP per
capita is the dependent variable, but only for particular periods or for particular ranges of starting
GDP per capita. Thus, a limited amount of convergence can exist at given times or for particular
groups  of  countries  but  we  find  no  evidence  of  a  general  convergence.  The  results  of  our
calculations show that (i) the mechanisms of growth and consequently of catch-up change (a) in the
course of time and (b) with the starting level of GDP per capita. Thus, the growth strategy using
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export variety seems to have been used effectively only in the period 1981-1999 while it was not a
significant determinant of growth in the previous period. Likewise, export variety is a significant
determinant of growth only for countries of high starting GDP per capita.  These results can be
explained if the target of catching up countries is not a fixed one but if it keeps changing both
qualitatively and quantitatively as a result of the previous development of leading countries. Thus,
in the period 1981-1999, in order to raise their export variety, countries needed to start doing more
systematically R&D, which means to develop innovation systems. In a similar way growing export
variety is a significant determinant of growth only for countries with a high starting level of GDP
per capita. The closer you get to the frontier of the time the more difficult it becomes to progress. In
summary, development paths change as a result of the previous development by leading countries.
At any given time the ingredients required to grow and the difficulties involved change as one
moves closer to the technological frontier. 
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